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ABSTRACT 
Background: Little is known about the economic impact of military mental health screening. 
Aims: To investigate (1) whether post-deployment screening of military personnel affects use and 
cost of services and (2) the impact of psychiatric morbidity on costs. 
Methods: Participants were recruited from UK Royal Marine and Army platoons and randomised to 
an intervention group (which received tailored advice predicated upon mental health status) or a 
control group (which received general advice following assessment of mental health status). The 
intervention costs were calculated while service use and associated costs were assessed at 12-
month follow-up. 
Results: Data were available for 6,323 participants. Mean screening cost was £34. Service costs were 
slightly higher in the control group compared to the intervention group (£1,197 vs. £1,147) which 
was not statistically significant (bootstrapped 95% CI, -£363 to £434. In both groups, screening and 
control, costs were significantly higher for those who screened positive for mental health problems.  
Conclusion: Costs were not affected by screening. In countries which have already implemented 
post-deployment screening, the political cost of disinvestment needs careful consideration. Those 
who develop psychiatric morbidity have substantially higher care costs than those who do not.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The probable prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), common mental disorders and 
alcohol misuse among UK military personnel deployed to military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq 
between 2003 and 2009 has been shown to be four percent, 20% and 16% respectively.1 For military 
personnel who are aware that they have a mental disorder, the rate at which they seek professional 
help varies between 30% and 50%, reaching 75% for US personnel in a recent study.2-6 Suggested 
barriers to help-seeking include internal and external stigma, the practicality of consulting (e.g. 
scheduling an appointment or having time off for treatment), not knowing the type of help available, 
and concern that employers might blame an individual for their problems.7,8 
Post-deployment screening for mental health problems has been introduced in several countries 
including the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the Netherlands to help direct 
individuals who screen positive to appropriate care.9-11 Screening is understood as the presumptive 
identification of a previously unrecognised disorder using tests to distinguish those who probably 
had a disorder from those who probably do not so that those people who probably had a disorder 
could be referred and be treated if the disorder is confirmed.12 Screening is not merely the use of a 
test related to a disorder. Little is known about the financial costs associated with post-deployment 
screening, in terms both of the screening itself and the costs of helping services subsequently 
accessed. In the UK, although structured support is available, there is currently no routine post-
deployment screening for personnel returning from deployment. The first randomised controlled 
trial (RCT) of the effectiveness of post-deployment screening has recently been conducted and 
shown to be ineffective, as there were not differences in prevalence between the screened and the 
control groups in relation to the psychiatric outcomes of interest (PTSD, depression or anxiety and 
alcohol misuse) or help seeking for mental disorders.13 This paper aims to (i) compare service use 
and costs for those randomised to receive tailored advice about help seeking following screening 
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with those who received general advice and (ii) compare costs for those that screened positive for 
mental health problems.  
METHODS 
Study design 
Eligible personnel had recently returned from a tour of duty in Afghanistan at the time of 
assessment (October 2011- October 2014).13 Personnel were recruited from Royal Marine and Army 
platoon sized groups (comprising approximately 35 people). The letter sent to participants is 
included as an appendix. Platoons were the unit of randomisation with two arms: the screening 
group, which received tailored advice following an offline computer self-administered assessment of 
mental health status, and the control group, which received general advice to seek help if they felt it 
necessary following the same procedure as the screening group. The initial assessment of personnel 
was carried out between six and 12 weeks post-deployment and reassessment took place 15.0 (SD 
3.3) months for the screening group and 15.4 (SD3.6) months the control group after the initial 
assessment. This variation was due to the need to adjust our schedule to match the duties of a 
highly mobile population. We adjusted for this difference in the analyses assessing effectiveness and 
help seeking behaviour.  The study followed Zelen’s randomisation design where individuals in the 
intervention group are asked to consent before receiving tailored advice related to their mental 
health status, but that option was not given to those receiving general advice in the control group.14 
For both the intervention and control groups, a letter reiterating the specific or general advice 
received at the end of the mental illness assessment was posted within two weeks of the initial 
assessment. The study was approved by the Ministry of Defence Research Ethics Committee 
(MODREC) Ref. Protocol 187/Gen/10 and King’s College Research Policy and Ethics Ref PNM10/11-
112. We needed to contact these two ethics committees annually as well as to report to Human 
Research Protection Office Continuing Review Submission Checklist (USAMRMC) that our study 
received approval from these two committees every year during the durations of the project. Details 
of the study design and outcome results have been described in detail elsewhere,13 including how 
we dealt with non-response in the reassessment stage in our intention to treat analyses. In 
summary, potential risk of bias in the estimated screening effect, because of missing data, was 
handled under missing at random assumption by making additional adjustments for rank, age and 
date of deployment, which were associated with probability of missingness. 
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Service use and costs  
Intervention cost 
The cost of the screening intervention was based on staff time required to deliver it and time taken 
by the participant to complete. It was assumed that the intervention delivery would require 5.5 full-
time staff and the total annual salary costs plus overheads were estimated to be £417,019. Given the 
numbers deploying at the time of the study, it was estimated that 20,000 returnees would be 
screened in a year at a cost per person of £21. Finally, we assumed that the time costs of those being 
screened, assuming a duration of 45 minutes, amounted to £13. The overall cost per person 
screened therefore amounted to £34. We have excluded travel costs from these calculations. These 
would depend on location of staff and personnel. Screening of control participants took place but 
this was without tailored advice and costs were not assigned to this group. The cost of assessment of 
the control group was zero, as there is no requirement to assess mental disorder status following 
deployment in the UK Armed Forces.   
Use of health services 
The economic analyses adopted a healthcare perspective. Health service use specific to military and 
non-military health services was collected as part of the follow-up assessment. For both military and 
non-military settings, services included GP consultations, contacts with mental health nurses, 
psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, other medical professionals, in-patient stays, and 
prescribed medication. Services that are specific to military health include contacts with padres, 
Trauma Risk Management (TRiM), welfare officers, and use of a telephone helpline provided by the 
military. Services specific to non-military health services include accident and emergency visits, 
contacts with military charities, and use of alternative therapies. Data were collected on services 
used and the number of contacts. For inpatient care, data were collected on the number of days 
spent in hospital for psychiatric, physical, and rehabilitation treatments. Where a service had been 
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used but the number of contacts was missing, the median values from those who had this 
information were used. 
Costs of services used  
Costs of military health services were provided by the Military Capability Output Costing team based 
at Army Headquarters in Andover. Costs of non-military health services were taken from the 
University of Kent annual compendium from 2014 and the National Health Service (NHS) schedule of 
reference costs for 2013/2014.15,16 Exceptions to these were: costs for military charities which was 
taken as the national average wage rates;17 and costs for certain other military professionals (e.g. 
medics and physiotherapists) which was taken as the mean ratio of military and non-military health 
service unit costs (estimated at £0.74 per minute of contact). Data on duration of mental health 
nurse costs and psychiatrist costs were taken from Bauer et al.18 The list of all costs is provided in 
Table 1. Service costs were calculated by combining the service use data with appropriate unit costs. 
Medication costs were estimated using prescription costs taken from the Prescription Cost Analysis 
for England 2014.19 All costs, in UK pounds, were estimated at 2013-2014 prices except for 
medication costs which were estimated at 2014 prices. 
Analysis 
Descriptive statistics are presented for individual services. The significance of the difference in total 
costs between the two groups was tested using a bootstrapped regression model to account for the 
likely skewed data.20 A significance level of 5% was used and statistical analyses were performed 
using STATA versions 11 and 14. 
The mean total costs for the intervention group and the control group were dominated by the costs 
of hospital inpatient care. It is rare that post-deployment screening for mental illness would lead to 
inpatient admission. We, therefore, tested the impact of excluding inpatient costs using one-way 
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sensitivity analysis. Specifically, we excluded inpatient costs that were related to physical inpatient 
and regional rehabilitation unit care.  
The randomised controlled trial showed that the outcomes were similar for those screened and 
those who were not. A significant and important difference in costs would indicate cost-
effectiveness for one group following a cost-minimisation approach. 
Service use and costs were also compared for those screening positive for mental health problems 
based on PTSD Checklist-Civilian (PCL-C),21 Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9),22 or Generalised 
Anxiety Disorder-7 (GAD-7) and alcohol misuse.23 The cut-offs used for the screening group in the 
initial assessment were a score of 40 or more for the PCL-C, a score of 40 to 49 prompted the advice 
to consult a welfare officer and a score of 50 or more to consult a Medical Officer (MO) or General 
Practitioner (GP). For PHQ-9 those with 3 to 5 positive responses were advised to see a welfare 
officer and those with 6 or more positive answers a MO or GP, For the GAD-7 those with a score of 
10 to 14 were advised to see a welfare officer and those with a score of 15 or more to consult a MO 
or GP. For alcohol misuse we used the Alcohol Use Disorder Identification Test (AUDIT), those with a 
score of 20 or more were advised to consult a welfare officer and those with a score of 5 or more on 
alcohol dependence or a score of 10 or more on alcohol harm were advised to see a MO or GP. The 
service use and cost comparison was performed for both intervention and control groups. 
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RESULTS 
Service use and costs 
In total 6323 participants of the 10,190 initially subjects belonging to the 434 randomised platoons 
were reassessed at follow-up, distributed into the intervention (n=3964) and control (n=2359) 
groups (Figure 1). This represented 62.4% of the original intervention group and 61.5% of the control 
group. Men accounted for 97% of both arms and in each the average age was 27.6 years. In both 
arms the distribution of rank was 46% NCO, 8% CO, and 46% other. The intervention arm consisted 
of 87% army personnel and 13% Royal marine, while for the control arm the figures were 82% and 
18% respectively. At baseline, in the intervention and control arms respectively 4.6% and 5.3% 
scored positive on the PCL-C, 3.8% and 3.4% on the PHQ-9, 2.2% and 2.0% on the GAD-7, and 8.2% 
and 7.5% on the AUDIT. Further details are given elsewhere.13 There were few major differences 
between the intervention and the control group in the use of services at follow-up (Table 2). For 
military specific services, the most commonly used health services were GPs, other professionals, 
and mental health nurses. For non-military specific services, the most commonly used services were 
GPs, accident and emergency and other healthcare professionals. For non-military health services, 
the mean number of contacts with social workers in the intervention group was nearly double that 
of the control group. Another difference was that the intervention group spent less time in 
psychiatric wards than the control group. Total service costs were on average £50 higher for the 
control group although this was not statistically significant (bootstrapped 95% CI, -£363 to £434). 
Mean costs excluding hospital care were £6 higher for the control group (bootstrapped 95% CI, -£29 
to £43). 
There were many differences in service use when comparisons were made between those screening 
positive for mental health problems (cases) and those who did not (non-cases) (Table 3). For almost 
all services, a greater proportion of cases used services than non-cases and for many services, the 
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number of contacts by users was also higher for cases. Differences between the intervention and 
controls in relation to the impact of testing positive for mental health problems were not evident 
other than for hospital care costs. For the intervention group, being a case resulted in mean costs 
that were £1053 more than for non-cases (bootstrapped 95% CI, £346 to £1799). For the control 
group the difference in mean costs was £3099 (bootstrapped 95% CI, £1139 to £5459). These 
differences are statistically significant. With hospital costs excluded in a sensitivity analysis the 
difference in means for the intervention group is £377 (bootstrapped 95% CI, £213 to £564) and for 
the control group it is £523 (bootstrapped 95% CI, £229 to £928). These differences are again 
statistically significant. 
 
DISCUSSION  
The cost of mental health screening was estimated to be £34 per individual when screening is 
conducted on a single occasion six to 12 weeks after the end of deployment. Overall, the use of 
health services was similar between the intervention and the control groups. We have previously 
shown that clinical outcomes for those receiving screening and tailored advice were not dissimilar to 
those who were assessed and received generic advice.12 Screening, as evaluated in this study, made 
little difference to costs or outcomes.  
We were also able to demonstrate that those who were positive on any of the measures of probable 
mental illness, PTSD, depression, anxiety and alcohol misuse, both in the screening and control 
groups incurred substantial higher costs for accessing medical and welfare systems than those who 
were negative for any mental health disorder, suggesting that the tools used in our study identified 
appropriately those who have a probable mental disorder. This also provides evidence for the cost 
impact of ‘common’ mental disorders in the Armed Forces. 
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In the US, screening is recommended at different time points after the end of deployment.24 A face-
to-face component would have increased the cost of screening substantially. The responsibility for 
the face-to-face interview falls on the primary care provider. Most of the assessments are completed 
by the unit`s military primary care provider so the assessment team does not need to travel. Most of 
the face-to-face assessments are carried out by medical personnel already recruited and working 
within military healthcare, although there are bases where personnel are contracted specifically for 
this role. In this context the US has flexibility to provide a post-deployment screening service and the 
marginal cost investment of the screening programme would be small (Dr DJ Lee personal 
communication). The face-to-face interview would take 10 min, but it can take longer if service 
personnel have endorsed symptoms for a mental disorder and a decision to refer has been taken (Dr 
DJ Lee personal communication). 
In contrast to the US, the UK system would be peripatetic. It would be impractical to carry out the 
questionnaire completion in a primary care, as fewer service personnel would be prepared to travel 
to a primary care setting to complete the questionnaire. We have argued that a face-to-face element 
might not be desirable, as participants might modify their knowing that a subsequent interview with 
healthcare staff would ensue should they screen positive for suspected mental illness; such an 
interview might well result in adverse occupational consequences. If the screening system were to 
be implemented it may be difficult to recruit or re-deploy medical officers solely to undertake the 
face-to-face element of the screening programme. The most feasible approach would be to recruit 
personnel who would be trained specifically for the tasks related to screening and who would 
facilitate the contact of subjects with a confirmed psychiatric disorder to appropriate services. 
Details of screening programmes in other Armed Forces have been published elsewhere.25  
The cost per individual in a screening programme was not excessive at £34 per individual. Although 
this cost is low, the intervention was not effective. Decisions as to whether a new programme should 
be implemented need to be made in the specific context of healthcare arrangements and availability 
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in each participating country. The start-up and maintenance cost of such a service would be difficult 
to justify, particularly as it would have to compete with programmes that seek to develop effective 
welfare services, primary care services and liaison mental health specialities, all of which might help 
to reduce the percentage of individuals who are referred to defence mental health services, those 
who fail to attend after initial mental health assessment, or who subsequently stop treatment 
prematurely.  
In countries that have already implemented screening for mental disorders, a value judgement could 
be made that the cost of the programme might be a fair trade-off for a slight reduction in the ability 
of the Armed Forces to care for service personnel. There is also a political and public opinion 
consideration where it might be difficult to withdraw a screening service even if it were to be proven 
ineffectual.  
It is worth keeping in mind that the evaluation of the cost of post-deployment screening in the 
current study considered only one episode of assessment. The US screening programme consists of 
several assessments undertaken at various times following deployment.24 The cost of such an 
approach is multiplied with each additional assessment. In addition, there is the issue of the 
potential for additional costs associated with each false-positive or false-negative screening 
outcome. Any screening programme would need to be carefully assessed for overall validity, 
precision and reliability. 
There was no significant difference in the costs between the intervention and control group. If those 
with a mental health disorder had followed the advice that they received then the demand for 
health care services would have increased in the screening group in comparison to the control group 
and this would have increased the overall cost of the screening programme. Hopefully this would 
have been coupled with improved outcomes. 
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Limitations 
Service use data were obtained via participant self-report. Recalling healthcare and welfare service 
contact episodes may not always have been done with full accuracy. However, to facilitate a 
comprehensive costing approach, this was the only option as healthcare records would not contain 
this breadth of information. In other healthcare studies, it has been demonstrated that patient self-
report is an acceptable method of assessing help seeking.26,27 A further limitation is that we do not 
formally link costs to outcomes. Many outcomes were measured and there were no major 
differences between the groups. Cost-effectiveness analyses can still be conducted in such 
circumstances, but the clear lack of effect led us to focus here just on the costs of service delivery. 
Implications 
The screening intervention at £34 per person is relatively inexpensive. If mental health screening and 
the provision of help seeking advice had been effective in encouraging treatment seeking then it 
may have been reasonable to recommend it for roll out. However, there was a lack of effectiveness 
and even with modest savings following the intervention, it cannot be seen to be a good investment 
in countries which have not already implemented such a programme. Disinvestment in screening 
may be perceived to have a higher political cost than the economic cost of post-deployment 
screening in countries with an active programme.  
12 
 
 
REFERENCES 
1 Fear NT, Jones M, Murphy D, et al: What are the consequences of deployment to Iraq and 
Afghanistan on the mental health of the UK armed forces? A cohort study. Lancet 375: 1783–1797, 
2010 
2 Hoge CW, Castro CA, Messer SC, et al: Combat duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, mental health 
problems, and barriers to care. N Engl J Med 351: 13–22, 2004 
3 Hoge CW, Auchterlonie JL, Milliken CS. Mental health problems, use of mental health 
services, and attrition from military service after returning from deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. 
JAMA 295: 1023–1032, 2006 
4 Iversen A, Dyson C, Smith N, et al: 'Goodbye and good luck': The mental health needs and 
treatment experiences of British ex-service personnel. Br J Psych 186: 480–486, 2005 
5 Hoge CW, Grossman SH, Auchterlonie JL, et al: PTSD treatment for soldiers after combat 
deployment: low utilization of mental health care and reasons for dropout. Psychiatr Serv 65: 997–
1004, 2014 
6 Hines LA, Goodwin L, Jones M, et al: Factors affecting help seeking for mental health 
problems after deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan. Psychiatr Serv 65: 98-105, 2014 
7 Iversen A, van Staden L, Hughes J, et al: The stigma of mental health problems and other 
barriers to care in the UK Armed Forces. BMC Health Serv Res 11 (31), 2011 
8 Murphy D, Busuttil W. PTSD, stigma and barriers to help-seeking within the UK Armed 
Forces. J R Army Med Corps 161: 322-326, 2015 
13 
 
9 Searle AK, Van Hooff M, McFarlane AC, et al: The validity of military screening for mental 
health problems: diagnostic accuracy of the PCL, K10 and AUDIT scales in an entire military 
population. Int J Methods Psychiatr Res 24: 32–45, 2015 
10 Vermetten E, Greenberg N, Boeschoten MA, et al: Deployment-related mental health 
support: comparative analysis of NATO and allied ISAF partners. Eur J Psychotraumatol 5 (1), 2014 
11 Zamorski MA, Rusu C, Garber BG. Prevalence and correlates of mental health problems in 
Canadian Forces personnel who deployed in support of the mission in Afghanistan: findings from 
postdeployment screenings, 2009-2012. Can J Psychiatry 59: 319–26, 2014 
12 Porta M. A Dictionary of Epidemiology. Oxford University Press 6th Edition, 2014 
13 [removed for blind review] 
14 Torgerson DJ, Roland M. What is Zelen's design? BMJ 316: 606, 1998 
15 Curtis L: Unit Costs of Health and Social Care. Canterbury, PSSRU, University of Kent, 2014 
16 Department of Health: National Health Service schedule of reference costs 2013-2014. 
www.gov.uk/government/collections/nhs-reference-costs, 2015 
17 Office for National Statistics: Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, 2012 Revised Results (All 
employees). www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.html?edition=tcm%3A77-
328218, 2013 
18 Bauer A, Pawlby SJ, Plant DT, et al: Perinatal depression and child development: exploring 
the economic consequences from a South London cohort. Psychol Med 45: 51-61, 2015 
19 NHS Digital: Prescription Cost Analysis, England – 2014. 
http://content.digital.nhs.uk/catalogue/PUB17274, 2015 
14 
 
20 Barber JA, Thompson SG. Analysis of cost data in randomized trials: an application of the 
non-parametric bootstrap. Stat Med 19: 3219–3236., 2000 
21 Blanchard EB, Jones-Alexander J, Buckley TC, et al: Psychometric properties of the PTSD 
Checklist (PCL). Behav Res Ther 34: 669–73, 1996 
22 Spitzer RL, Kroenke K, Williams JB. Validation and utility of a self-report version of PRIME-
MD: the PHQ primary care study. Primary Care Evaluation of Mental Disorders. Patient Health 
Questionnaire. JAMA 282: 1737–1744, 1999 
23 Kroenke K, Spitzer RL, Williams JB, et al: Anxiety disorders in primary care: prevalence, 
impairment, comorbidity, and detection. Ann Intern Med 146: 317–25, 2007 
24 Lee DJ, Warner CH, Hoge CW. Advances and controversies in military posttraumatic stress 
disorder screening. Curr Psychiatry Rep 16: 467, 2014 
25 Vermetten, E., Greenberg, N., Boeschoten, M. A., Delahaije, R., Jetly, R., Castro, C. A., et al. 
(2014). Deployment-related mental health support: comparative analysis of NATO and allied ISAF 
partners. Eur J Psychotraumatol, 5. 
26 Goldberg RW, Seybolt DC, Lehman A. Reliable self-report of health service use by individuals 
with serious mental illness. Psychiatr Serv 53: 879–891, 2002 
27 Caslyn RJ, Allen G, Morse GA, et al: Can you trust self-report data provided by homeless 
mentally ill individuals? Eval Rev 17: 353–366, 1993 
 
15 
 
 
Figure 1. Participants, percentage rates and numbers leaving the study at each stage by arm of the 
trial. Percentages estimated from total service personnel in each arm at enrolment 
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434 platoons 
sampled into trial 
274 platoons allocated 
to intervention (n = 
6,350) 
160 platoons 
allocated to control 
(n = 3,840) 
Enrolment 
Allocation 
Received intervention 
questionnaire (n = 
5,577 (87.8%)) 
3 deceased 
770 did not 
receive 
questionnaire 
 
Received control 
questionnaire (n = 
3,149 (82.0%)) 
3 deceased 
688 did not 
receive 
questionnaire 
 
Follow-Up 
3,996 (62.9%) 
responses at follow-up 
(includes 288 non-
responders at 
baseline) 
  
2,369 (61.7%) 
responses at follow-
up (includes 241 
non-responders at 
baseline) 
3 died 
158 had no 
contact details 
398 declined 
1,310 did not 
respond 
 
1 died 
106 had no 
contact details 
197 declined 
717 did not 
respond 
 Analysis 
3,964 analysed (32 
excluded from analysis 
due to missing service 
use data) 
  
2,359 analysed (10 
excluded from analysis 
due to missing service 
use data) 
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Table 1: Unit costs per item of military and non-military services, and prescription  
 Costs per contact 
(£) 
Basis of estimate 
Source of data 
  Duration Costs per minutes 
(£) 
 
Screening Intervention £34   Calculated from data collected by 
study team 
     
Military health and welfare services    Land Environment Military 
Capability Output Cost Study 
(LEMCOCS) 
Military Medical Officer £49 Surgery appointment lasting 15 mins  £3·27  
 
Mental health nurse (MHN) £47 Assumed subsequent appointments lasting 30 mins  £1·55  
Psychologist £44 Assumed MHN duration  £1·46  
Social worker £18 Assumed MHN duration  £0·59  
Psychiatrist £104 Assumed MHN duration  £3·48  
Other professional* £21 Assumed MHN duration  £0·70  
Padre £64 Assumed MHN duration  £2·14  
TRiM personnel £21 Assumed MHN duration  £0·70  
Welfare officer £26 Assumed MHN duration  £0·85  
Telephone helpline £8 Assumed MHN duration  £0·25  
     
Non-military health and welfare 
services 
   14-17 
General practitioner £42 Surgery appointment lasting 11.7 mins  £3·60   
Mental health nurse £58 Appointment lasting 46.8 mins; cost  £1·23   
Psychologist £124 Appointment lasting 54 mins; cost  £2·30  
Social worker £29 Assumed military health service MHN duration £0·95   
Psychiatrist £107 Appointment lasting 45 mins  £2·37   
Other professional £22 Assumed military health service MHN duration £0·74   
Hospital Accident & Emergency £135 Cost per bed day   
SSAFA £8 Assumed military health service MHN duration £0·25  
 Online help £8 Assumed military health service MHN duration £0·25  
Service charities £8 Assumed military health service MHN duration £0·25  
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Hospital Inpatient    14, 15 
Inpatient psychiatric treatment £351 Cost per occupied bed day   
Inpatient physical treatment £603 Average cost per episode   
Regional rehabilitation unit £603 Average cost per episode  
     
Medication    18 
Antidepressants £5 Antidepressant Drugs  Weighted average 
of cost per 
prescription 
 Sleeping tablets £8 Analgesics  
Painkillers £5 Hypnotics And Anxiolytics  
MHN = mental health nurse, SSAFA = Soldier, Sailors, Airmen & families association, PSSRU = Personal Social Services Research Unit, ONS = Office for National Statistics 
*Unit costs not available. Unit cost calculated as the mean ratio of military and non-military unit costs 
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Table 2: Service use and costs (2013/14 £s) at follow-up assessments by intervention or control group 
Service 
Intervention group (n = 3964) Control group (n = 2359) 
% 
Using 
Mean 
number of 
contacts 
Mean 
Cost (£) 
% 
using 
Mean 
number of 
contacts 
Mean 
Cost (£) 
Intervention   34   0 
       
Military health and welfare 
services       
Military Medical Officer 49 3·5 85 51 3·6 90 
Mental health nurse 10 4·8 22 11 5·1 26 
Psychologist 2 4·5 4 2 5·0 5 
Social worker 1 3·4 1 1 4·4 1 
Psychiatrist 2 5·8 11 2 5·1 13 
Other professional 27 5·8 33 31 6·4 42 
Padre 4 2·2 5 4 3·4 9 
TRiM personnel 4 1·5 1 5 2·3 2 
Welfare officer 8 2·3 5 9 3·1 7 
Telephone helpline 1 5·0 <1 1 3·3 <1 
       
Non-military health and 
welfare services       
General practitioner 14 2·6 16 16 2·6 17 
Mental health nurse 2 2·8 3 2 6·1 6 
Psychologist 1 5·8 5 1 6·8 7 
Social worker <1 10·4 1 <1 5·3 1 
Psychiatrist 1 5·3 3 1 7·4 6 
Other professional 5 4·6 5 6 5·2 7 
20 
 
Hospital A&E 9 1·6 19 9 1·8 21 
SSAFA 1 2·1 <1 1 3·5 <1 
Online help 1 3·1 <1 1 4·4 <1 
Service charities 1 2·9 <1 1 4·2 <1 
       
Hospital inpatient 
      
Inpatient psychiatric treatment 1 15·6 48 1 29·4 114 
Inpatient physical treatment 4 8·3 202 4 11·3 258 
Regional rehabilitation unit 5 21·4 616 5 16·4 538 
       
Medication 
      
Antidepressants 3 
 
1 3 
 
<1 
Sleeping tablets 13 
 
<1 7 
 
1 
Painkillers 65 
 
27 64 
 
27 
       
Total non-hospital cost   282   288 
Total cost   1147   1197 
* Adjusted for age, service arm, rank, and deployment 
SSAFA, Soldier, Sailors, Airmen & families association; Hospital A&E, Hospital Accident and Emergency department; TRiM, Trauma risk management SD, standard deviation 
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Table 3: Service use and costs (2013/14 £s) at follow-up assessments by group and caseness 
 
 Intervention group Control group 
 Case Non-case Case Non-case 
 % 
using 
Mean 
number  
of contacts 
Mean 
Cost 
(£) 
% 
using 
Mean 
number 
Of contacts 
Mean 
Cost 
(£) 
% 
using 
Mean 
number 
of contacts 
Mean 
Cost 
(£) 
% 
using 
Mean 
number 
of contacts 
Mean 
Cost 
(£) 
Intervention   34   34   0   0 
             
Military health and 
welfare services 
            
Military Medical Officer 58 4·6 129 48 3·5 82 64 5·1 160 50 3·5 85 
Mental health nurse 26 7·2 87 9 4·5 18 32 8·1 119 9 4·3 19 
Psychologist 7 6·4 21 2 4·0 3 10 6·0 26 2 4·6 3 
Social worker 4 5·2 3 1 2·9 <1 2 11·0 4 1 2·5 <1 
Psychiatrist 8 9·9 81 2 4·4 7 12 4·9 62 2 5·4 10 
Other professional  5·3 31  5·8 33  6·8 53  6·4 41 
Padre 9 2·5 52 3 2·2 5 14 3·4 62 3 2·1 14 
TRiM personnel 8 1·9 3 4 1·5 1 13 4·0 11 4 1·6 1 
Welfare officer 18 3·6 17 7 2·1 4 19 3·9 20 8 2·8 5 
Telephone helpline 2 19·7 4 1 1·8 <1 3 2·0 1 1 3·6 <1 
              
Non-Military health 
and welfare services 
            
General practitioner 20 5·3 44 14 2·4 14 23 3·2 31 15 2·6 16 
Mental health nurse 5 5·3 15 1 2·2 2 6 11·9 41 1 4·2 3 
Psychologist 3 6·6 24 1 6·0 5 3 9·3 31 1 7·9 5 
Social worker 2 19·3 14 <1 5·7 <1 1 19·0 7 <1 2·2 <1 
Psychiatrist  9·4 29  2·8 1  13·2 47  5·0 3 
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Other professional 6 12·9 17 4 4·0 4 8 8·8 16 6 4·3 5 
Hospital A&E 13 1·6 28 9 1·5 19 15 2·8 58 8 1·7 18 
SSAFA 1 1·0 <1 1 2·2 <1 2 13·3 2 1 1·9 <1 
Online help 2 7·6 1 1 1·9 <1 5 7·4 3 1 2·6 <1 
Service charities 4 2·7 1 1 2·3 <1 2 14·7 2 1 2·4 <1 
             
Hospital inpatient             
Psychiatric 3 19·1 221 1 15·5 38 5 33·5 631 1 18·7 50 
Physical 5 9·8 315 4 6·9 168 7 13·3 538 4 9·4 213 
RRU 9 16·8 873 4 19·5 528 14 24·8 2108 5 14·9 439 
             
Medication             
Antidepressants 13  2 3  <1 13  3 2  <1 
Sleeping tablets 23  3 6  <1 19  2 6  <1 
Painkillers 72  37 65  27 80  43 62  25 
             
Total non-hospital costs   260   637   247   771 
Total cost   994   2047   950   4049 
SSAFA, Soldier, Sailors, Airmen & families association; Hospital A&E, Hospital Accident and Emergency department; TRiM, Trauma risk management SD, 
standard deviation 
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Appendix. A tailored advice letter in the screening arm of the study 
 
 
Dear Name of participant  
 
The POST Study POST-DEPLOYMENT HEALTH SCREENING OF THE UK ARMED FORCES  
 
Thank you again for filling out the computerised questionnaire as part of the POST Study. We hope 
you found the questions interesting and that they made you think actively about your mental health.  
From the replies you gave, it appears you are at risk of having the mental health issue listed below: 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).  
This may cause you some significant problems if you don’t get some help. We strongly recommend 
that you book an appointment with the medical centre to talk to a Medical Officer about the current 
difficulties you may be experiencing. It would help if you take this letter with you. We would ask you 
not to ignore this advice – instead, we strongly suggest that you make the time to discuss this letter 
directly with your Medical Officer. 
If you are a Regular, your medical centre will be able to help you. If you are a Reservist*, you can 
book an appointment with either your military medical centre, the Reservist Mental Health 
Programme or your GP. Even if your Medical Officer cannot help directly, they will be able to refer 
you on to a wide range of in-house mental health professionals who will be able to provide you with 
a range of specialist treatments if you require them. 
If you gave us consent to do so, we will contact you again in about 12 months to see how you are 
getting on. This will help us to understand how military personnel re-adjust after an operational 
tour. 
Yours sincerely 
